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Abstract—Data credibility is a crucial issue in mobile crowd
sensing (MCS) and, more generally, people-centric Internet of
Things (IoT). Prior work takes approaches such as incentive
mechanism design and data mining to address this issue, while
overlooking the power of crowds itself, which we exploit in this
paper. In particular, we propose a cross validation approach which
seeks a validating crowd to verify the data credibility of the original
sensing crowd, and uses the verification result to reshape the
original sensing dataset into a more credible posterior belief of the
ground truth. Following this approach, we design a specific cross
validation mechanism, which integrates four sampling techniques
with a privacy-aware competency-adaptive push (PACAP) algorithm
and is applicable to time-sensitive and quality-critical MCS ap-
plications. It does not require redesigning a new MCS system
but rather functions as a lightweight “plug-in”, making it easier
for practical adoption. Our results demonstrate that the proposed
mechanism substantially improves data credibility in terms of both
reinforcing obscure truths and scavenging hidden truths.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) ultimately boils down to the
“Internet of People” in the sense that virtually all the services
created by or via IoT have an ultimate goal of improving
people’s lives and experiences. In fact, IoT is not just a wired
universe of sensors and devices; rather, it also connects people
who in turn can play a critical role in the IoT ecosystem,
by acting as data or service providers and not merely service
consumers.
A key enabler of this vision is Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS)
[1], [2], a people-centric sensing and computing paradigm that
allows people who are equipped with mobile devices to act
as sensors to collect a deluge of sensing data, over a large
geographic area on a continuous time scale.
However, despite several advantages (e.g., cost efficiency) of
MCS as compared to “traditional” infrastructure-based IoT, one
critical challenge faced by MCS is data credibility or reliability.
That is, the quality of crowdsensed data can often be poor
and inconsistent due to the unaccountability and the diverse
nature of crowdworkers. Recent research efforts have attempted
to address this issue from multiple angles, which broadly span
from incentive mechanisms [3]–[9] to assessment of quality
and trustworthiness [10]–[12], and to truth discovery [13]–[15].
However, existing solutions focus on analyzing the indigenous
data or soliciting better quality data, while not fully utilizing
the “power of crowds” [16].
In this paper, we address the data credibility problem by
introducing a new cross validation approach into MCS. This
approach does not mean comparing a piece of data (contributed
by a worker1 as in the MCS context) against another piece of
data (contributed by another worker), which is similar to the ap-
proach used in the machine learning and data mining literature
1In this paper, we use “worker” and “crowdworker” interchangeably.
[17]. Instead, our proposed cross validation approach means
subjecting the crowdsensed data to a group of crowdworkers
who did not contribute to the original MCS data to seek their
verification, for the purpose of reshaping or “grooming” the
original sensed data toward the ground truth.
A counterargument, however, could be mounted as follows:
rather than introducing such “verifiers”, why not recruit another
group of contributors to contribute more sensing data, which
might also lead to a better representation of the ground truth?
While this alternative sounds plausible, the rationale for our
proposed cross validation approach are:
• MCS tasks typically have a spatiotemporal constraint,
meaning that a worker must be at a specific geographic
location during a specific time interval to collect a specified
type of sensing data, which precludes many workers from
being eligible contributors. However, there is a greater
chance that a broader set of workers may be able to obtain
relevant information from other channels (such as public
media, his personal social network, domain knowledge
or professional expertise). Therefore, these workers could
evaluate the quality of data although they may be unable
to contribute the actual content.
• MCS tasks typically dictate certain effort from and incur
sensing and communication costs to workers, and may
entail revealing their private information (e.g., home or
office locations) [18]. As a result, many workers may be
reluctant to participate in MCS. However, it may be easier
to convince them to simply provide a “second-opinion”
about already obtained MCS data, and hence increase the
likelihood of recruiting a large validating crowd in a short
time.
To summarize, our cross validation approach is justified by
the observation that the contribution process entails restric-
tive and fairly demanding requirements whereas the validation
process is much more lightweight and can amass much more
evidence.
However, while the principle seems promising, designing
a specific cross validation mechanism involves several key
challenges: (i) Doesn’t cross validation introduce another qual-
ity issue—the “quality of validation”? In other words, how
to ensure the competency of verifiers? (ii) How to expose
the crowdsensed data to the validating crowd in an effective
and efficient way? (iii) Since validation is to be performed
by humans (rather than by comparing datasets [17]), how to
minimize human biases and possible privacy intrusion? (iv)
How to effectively consolidate the original crowdsensed dataset
and the additional verification dataset? (v) How to provide
incentives to verifiers? (How) should the consolidated outcome
affect contributors’ incentives?
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This paper addresses all the above challenges, and our
contributions are summarized as follows.
1) We propose a new cross validation approach to address
the data credibility problem for MCS. Unlike many prior
works, it does not require redesigning MCS applications
(which could jeopardize prior investment), but rather func-
tions as a lightweight “plug-in” for existing MCS applica-
tions. For new MCS applications, the integration is even
seamless.
2) We design a specific cross validation mechanism which
integrates several sampling techniques with a progres-
sive privacy-aware competency-adaptive push (PACAP)
algorithm. Corresponding to the challenges listed above,
this mechanism is able to solicit unbiased opinions from
verifiers in a privacy-preserving manner, and reshape the
original MCS data by consolidating it with the verification
dataset to form a more credible posterior belief model of
the ground truth. Moreover, the mechanism also provides
incentives for verifiers and adjusts incentives for contribu-
tors based on the reshaped outcome.
3) The reshaped outcome (posterior belief) achieves sig-
nificant improvement by being able to both reinforcing
obscure (while identifiable) truths and scavenging hidden
truths buried in the original MCS dataset.
4) Our mechanism is practically viable because: (i) it does
not make strict assumptions on human rationality as most
game-theoretical studies do, nor does it assume any specific
(e.g., Gaussian) distribution of the underlying sensed phe-
nomenon; (ii) it requires minimal effort from crowdworkers
and is thus conducive to large-scale participation; (iii) it is
simple to implement and operates fully autonomously.
II. RELATED WORK
Data credibility is a crucial issue in the context of MCS and
people-centric IoT. A large body of prior work has attempted to
tackle this problem from different perspectives. One distinctive
line of research is to influence crowdworkers’ behaviors us-
ing incentive mechanisms such as auctions [3] and trust and
reputation systems [4], such that workers are compelled to
contribute high-quality data. For example, Jin et al. [5] designed
a quality-of-information aware incentive mechanism based on
reverse combinatorial auction, to maximize social welfare which
is a function of the quality of contributed data. A trust and
reputation system called simple endorsement web (SEW), as
proposed in [6], connects crowdworkers into a social network.
SEW incentivizes high-quality contributions using inter-worker
mutual benefits and a witness effect. Kamar and Horvitz [7]
designed an incentive mechanism with a consensus prediction
rule to induce truthful reporting, but the mechanism only applies
to crowdsourcing for a single correct answer. Bayesian truth
serum [8], [9] uses a scoring method that can remove bias in
favor of consensus, but it requires each worker to explicitly
predict the distribution of other workers’ reports, which restricts
its practicality.
A different thread of research has focused on evaluating the
quality of crowdsourced data or trustworthiness of crowdwork-
ers so that more informed decisions can be made (e.g., on data
or worker selection). Kantarci et al. [10] treated crowdworkers
to be part of a social network (based on the commonality of
tasks assigned) to assess the trustworthiness of workers and
data. Wu et al. [11] proposed a reputation system that not only
assesses but also predicts the trustworthiness of crowdworkers
without requiring their prior contributions. Huang et al. [12]
used the Gompertz function to calculate device reputation score
as a reflection of the trustworthiness of the contributed data.
The third active area of research is truth finding, which
aims to discover the ground truth by analyzing the noisy and
possibly conflicting MCS data (sometimes taking workers into
account as well), typically using data mining techniques. For
example, Wang et al. [13] uses the Expectation-Maximization
(EM) algorithm to find the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE)
of the probability that a given binary MCS measurement is true.
Davami and Sukthankar [14] combined multiple trust-based
data fusion techniques using AdaBoost, a machine learning
algorithm, to predict whether a parking lot is occupied, based
on crowdsourced user reports. Gisdakis et al. [15] proposed
SHIELD to perform outlier detection in presence of compro-
mised sensing devices, but it requires a large amount of data to
train the complex machine learning model.
Our proposed approach does not belong to any of these
categories; instead, it further exploits the power of crowds [16]
by introducing an extra (yet thin) layer of crowdsourcing on top
of the original crowd-sensing. Notably, it does not replace or
exclude prior work such as above, but rather plays a comple-
mentary role by reshaping the original data so that existing
methods (e.g., MLE) can still be applied (to the “reshaped
version”) to obtain better results.
Remark: Our designed cross validation mechanism makes
no assumption on whether the crowdsensed data must have
binary (like [13]), finite discrete, or continuous values, nor
does it assume there must be a single (like [7]) or multiple
ground truth(s). In addition, unlike many statistical methods,
it does not assume any specific (e.g., Gaussian) distribution of
the underlying sensing phenomenon, nor does it assume any
(common) prior held by crowdworkers. It also does not require
workers to predict the distribution of other workers’ reports as
in [8], [9].
Our mechanism is also distinctly different from the peer
voting or rating schemes used by online Q&A forums (e.g.,
Quora and Stackoverflow) and product/service review websites
(e.g., Amazon and TripAdvisor), in its suitability for time-
sensitive and quality-critical MCS applications. We elaborate
this in Section III-B.
III. CROSS VALIDATION DESIGN
We present a systematic cross validation mechanism designed
for MCS. It can be applied to general crowdsourcing platforms
such as Amazon mTurk, CrowdFlower, and MicroWorkers,
where many MCS campaigns are hosted. It can also be applied
to a standalone MCS application where typically only a handful
out of many registered workers are actually contributing in a
specific spatiotemporal window. In both cases, there are a large
pool of non-participants who we can exploit as the validating
crowd.
For an overview of our cross validation mechanism, it first
profiles the crowdsensed dataset in terms of its representative
values and the probabilistic distribution of the data. Second,
it presents the profile to the validating crowd using one of
four sampling methods. Third, it strategically approaches the
validating crowd using a PACAP algorithm to seek competent
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validation. Fourth, it reshapes the original MCS data profile
using the validation feedback obtained above. Finally, it com-
pletes the loop by providing an incentive scheme for both the
validating crowd and the original contributing crowd based on
the reshaped outcome.
A. Profiling
A profile χ = (V,P) consists of a set V of representative
values and a set P of probability masses corresponding to the
representative values. The representative values are meant to
represent the original crowdsensed data in a concise way while
not losing practical precision.
To obtain this profile, the server that collating sensing data
first creates a histogram of the crowdsensed data with an
appropriate resolution (i.e., the bin width) determined by the
specific MCS application. For example, in the case of road
traffic speed, a bin width of 5mph would be a suitable choice;
while for noise sensing, a bin width of 5dB would be reasonable.
Clearly, this is not restricted by whether the data is continuously
or discretely valued.
Second, the server designates a representative value vi for
each non-empty bin i = 1, 2, ..., n, where n is the total number
of bins. For this we choose the median of each bin, while any
other quantile of the data points, or the mean, of each bin can
also be chosen provided that the resolution (determined in the
previous step) is sufficiently high. Thus we obtain V = {vi|i =
1, 2, ..., n}.
Lastly, the server normalizes the histogram such that the bin
volume κi—the number of data points contained in a bin—
becomes a probability measure pi. That is, pi = κi/
∑n
j=1 κj .
Thus we obtain P = {pi|i = 1, 2, ..., n}.
Sometimes we also refer to P or pi as the interim belief so as
to differentiate from the prior belief which is without observa-
tion of data; similarly we refer to the updated version of interim
belief (after incorporating validation results in Section III-D) as
the posterior belief. Now, we can say that pi is the probability
that vi is the ground truth according to the interim belief.
B. Sampling
This procedure is to determine how to present the profile χ =
(V,P) to the validating crowd. A candidate method is to expose
χ or V at a public venue (e.g., a website) which is open to all
workers, who may then pick the “best” representative values that
they deem to be. This method is similar to what is used by many
Q&A forums such as Quora and Stackoverflow, e-commerce
platforms such as Amazon, and recommendation sites such as
TripAdvisor. However, it is too opportunistic by nature and not
suitable for typically time-sensitive and quality-critical MCS
applications, where we need to accumulate a sufficiently large
number of validation inputs within a short timeframe.
There are some alternatives, for example using subsets of
values and/or workers, but they all have drawbacks (omitted due
to space constraint) that eventually lead us to the following.
In our method, we present a single representative value to
each chosen worker and ask him to give a single rating (e.g.,
“Agree” or “Disagree”) to that value. This requires minimal
effort from each worker, and allows for the flexibility of using
fine-grained (i.e., multi-level) rating options. In this section,
we address the problem of selecting representative values for
effective validation, while the problem of selecting workers and
approaching them for ratings is addressed in Section III-C.
Our specific method of value selection is to sample each
representative vi ∈ V with a sampling probability si such that
each sampled value (not necessarily unique) will be presented
to a (unique) rater. In particular, we consider the following
sampling methods:
1) Random Sampling: si = 1/n, so that all the representatives
will be equally likely sampled.
2) Proportional Sampling: si = pi, so that a value that
appears more often (hence more likely to be a truth) will
be verified by more people.
3) Reverse Sampling: si ∝ d−pi where d is a constant. Hence
by normalization we have
si =
d− pi
nd− 1 . (1)
Choosing a value for d may appear straightforward since 1,
the upper bound on all probabilities, seems to be the natural
choice. However, this will become problematic when all
the pi’s are fairly small (e.g., below 0.2), which is not
uncommon. In that case, a value such as d = 1 will
even out the differences among all the si’s, and essentially
equate reverse sampling to random sampling. Hence, we
“mirror” P (as if P was plotted) with reference to its
“waistline”, pmin+pmax2 , where pmin = minpi∈P pi and
pmax = maxpi∈P pi, and set d = pmin + pmax.
4) Inverse Sampling: si ∝ 1/pi, so we have
si =
1
pi∑n
i=1
1
pi
. (2)
While random sampling and proportional sampling are most
intuitive, we also explore reverse sampling and inverse sampling
based on the following rationale:
• Values that frequently occur in the original crowdsensed
dataset have already accumulated sufficient “votes” from
crowdworkers and hence do not need as much validation
as the less-occurring values.
• The real truth or the most-valuable information can some-
times be uncommon and thus buried in a haystack of
common observations. However, conventional statistical
methods generally filter out those minorities as outliers
[19]. Reverse sampling and inverse sampling, on the other
hand, usher in the opportunity of “scavenging the hidden
truths”.
The above sampling methods are compared in Section IV.
C. Privacy-Aware Competency-Adaptive Push (PACAP)
In contrast to the passive approach taken by many e-
commerce websites and Q&A forums which “wait” for users to
come to give feedback, we take a proactive approach to “push”
rating tasks to a strategically chosen set of workers, whom we
call raters, to seek their ratings.
A push-based approach, however, faces two main issues. One
is privacy, where improper (too frequent or irrelevant) pushes
can be intrusive and annoying. The other is competency, where
a chosen rater may not have the relevant information or domain
knowledge to give a reliable rating, or may even purposely give
false ratings.
In addition, there are also quantity requirements and time
constraints we need to satisfy. Specifically, the problem state-
ment is to collect a desired number m of effective ratings,
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under a shortfall tolerance level α, within a timeframe T0.
Here, an effective rating is one that indicates a rater’s posi-
tive or negative—instead of “neutral”—preference (there is a
good reason, though, to keep the “neutral” rating, which will
be explained in Section III-C2). The shortfall tolerance level
α ∈ (0, 1) dictates that the any number below m(1 − α)
is unacceptable (while m is more desirable). Moreover, the
collected ratings are preferred to be unbiased.
Our solution is a privacy-aware competency-adaptive push
(PACAP) algorithm. We explain its general design principles
in Section III-C1–3, and then present its specifics in Sec-
tion III-C4.
1) Anti-bias: Let us denote by U the set of all the workers
registered on the MCS platform, and by C the set of contributors
who have contributed to the original sensing task (C ⊆ U).
We take three anti-bias measures. First, we exclude C from
U to preclude contributors’ biases toward their own respective
contributions. Second, we ensure that each rater will receive
at most one rating task. A rating task is composed of a
representative value vi ∈ V , sampled according to Section III-B,
a task description, and a list of rating options.2 Third, we
mandate a neutral rating, which is explained below as it is also
a measure of competency control.
2) Competency (quality) control: In order to collect com-
petent ratings, we associate each worker j = 1, 2, ..., |U| with a
reputation Rj , which characterizes how accurate or reliable j’s
past ratings were and is used as a proxy of j’s competency. The
reputation Rj is one of the (three) factors that determine each
worker’s opportunity of receiving offers (all the three factors as
contained in (3) will be explained in detail in Section III-C3).
An offer is a rating task; we call it this way because it can
potentially lead to an increase in the recipient’s reputation
(detailed in Section III-E). But on the flip side, it can also lead
to penalty if the rater’s rating is opposite to the final verdict,
in which case his reputation will be reduced. Therefore, we
include a mandatory neutral rating option in every offer to allow
a chosen rater to decline an offer without being penalized (e.g.,
if he deems himself not competent for that particular rating
task). Therefore, by including both opportunity and risk as well
as a neutral option, our offers prompt raters to only rate for
tasks they are competent at, and to give unbiased ratings.
3) Privacy awareness: Our push approach incorporates a
privacy-aware competency-adaptive scheme, which selects a
rater j at time t according to a probability qj(t) defined by
qj(t) =
1− e−λj(t−t−j )(Rj+)∑
j∈Ψ
[
1− e−λj(t−t−j )(Rj+)
] , j ∈ Ψ (3)
where Ψ is a (dynamically updated) pool of workers from which
we progressively search for raters, and
• λj ≥ 0 is a personalized elasticity parameter catering for
each worker’s individual privacy preference,
• t−j is the last time when j was given an offer, or the time
when he signed up on the MCS platform if he has never
been given an offer before,
2For example, the task description could be “Is the following value rep-
resentative of the average traffic speed of Broadway, New York City during
the morning peak hours today?” or “Is the following value representative of
the average noise level at Lakewood Industrial Park between 8-10am today?”,
and the rating options could be {“Disagree”, “Neutral”, “Agree”} or {“Very
unlikely”, “Unlikely”, “Not Sure”, “Likely”, “Very likely”}.
• Rj ≥ 0 is j’s reputation described above, and
•  is a small positive constant (e.g., 0.1) to ensure that users
with Rj = 0 (such as new users) also have chance to
receive offers.
The competency-adaptivity is explained by the fact that
reputation Rj in (3) will determine each worker’s probability of
receiving offers. The privacy-awareness is accounted for by the
following two factors. First, the exponent (t−t−j ) automatically
spaces out the “pushes” to the same worker, which not only
avoids too frequent pushes but also mitigates starvation by
giving priority to workers who have not been offered a task
for a long time. Note that, more reputable workers are still
favored given the same waiting period. Second, the parameter
λj allows for personalized privacy handling as follows. It is
initialized as a constant (say 1) for all the workers in U . Then
in each offer, we include three optional actions for the rater to
choose: “Send me more”, “Send me less”, and “Stop sending to
me”, which correspond to updating λj ← min(λj + δ, λmax),
λj ← max(λj − δ, ), and λj ← 0, respectively. Here δ
is a step size (e.g., 0.2), and λmax is a cap (e.g., 1.6) that
prevents malicious users from abusing λj to offset their low
reputation Rj . Thus, we are able to accommodate individual
privacy preferences while not jeopardizing the rater recruitment.
4) Progressive PACAP: Given the above design principles,
now we explain the entire algorithm.
In view of the time constraint T0 and uncertain and dynamic
worker behaviors, the algorithm divides T0 into multiple cycles
of smaller interval τ each, and performs progressive push over
cycles. By progressive we mean that in each cycle the algorithm
will approach a different group of workers of a different scale
(group size) with a different number of offers, which are all
re-calculated for each cycle by learning from previous cycles
and adapting to the current. The rationale is to cater for the
uncertainty and dynamics of worker responses (declination,
acceptance, delay, or non-response).
The pseudo-code is given in Algorithm 1 with key notation
given in Table I. In particular, we explain Line 16 or Eq. (4),
which describes how the algorithm determines m(k + 1), i.e.,
the number of raters to approach in the next (i.e., (k + 1)-
th) cycle. First, it notes that the number of effective ratings
remaining to be collected is m −MY (k). Second, it predicts
the likelihood of obtaining an effective rating from a user in
M(k+ 1) to be MY (k)/ [MY (k) +MN (k)], by assuming that
the non-responding users of the current (k-th) cycle will respond
(subsequently till T0) with the same ratio as the users who have
responded so far (till the k-th cycle). Thus, a division yields (4).
D. Reshaping
Given two heterogeneous datasets, i.e., the original MCS data
profile χ = (V,P) obtained in Section III-A, and the set of
effective ratings R obtained in Section III-C, we consolidate
them by reshaping χ using R.
To this end, we first assign a score to each rating op-
tion contained in a rating task, as {−wl, ...,−w2,−w1, 0,
w1, w2, ..., wl} where 0 < w1 < w2 < ... < wl, for
(2l + 1)-level rating options. For example, 3-level rating op-
tions like {“Disagree”, “Neutral”, “Agree”} may be assigned
scores {−1, 0, 1}, while 5-level rating options like {“Very
unlikely”, “Unlikely”, “Not Sure”, “Likely”, “Very likely”} may
be assigned scores {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2}. In the following, without
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Algorithm 1: Progressive PACAP
Input: Crowdworkers U , contributors C, representatives V ,
target m, tolerance α, deadline T0
Output: R = {〈rj(vi), j, vi〉|rj(vi) 6= 0, j ∈ U , vi ∈ V}
with |R| ≥ m · (1− α), or FAIL otherwise
1 R ← ∅,Ψ← U \ C
2 m(1)← m, MY (0)← 0, MN (0)← 0
3 for k ← 1 to T0/τ do
4 select m(k) raters, denoted by a set M(k), from Ψ
according to Eq. (3)
5 for each j ∈M(k) do
6 obtain one vi ∈ V using a sampling method from
Section III-B
7 wrap vi in a rating task and push it to rater j to
seek rating rj(vi)
8 end
9 wait for τ while collecting ratings:
◦ R(k)← {〈rj(vi), j, vi〉|rj(vi) 6= 0}
◦ mN (k)←
∑
j 1rj(vi)=0
10 R ← R∪R(k), mY (k)← |R(k)|
11 if |R| ≥ m then
12 return R // SUCCESS *
13 end
// Prepare for the next cycle:
14 update Ψ← Ψ \M(k)
15 MY (k)←MY (k − 1) +mY (k),
MN (k)←MN (k − 1) +mN (k),
16 determine the scale of next outreach:
m(k + 1)← [m−MY (k)]
[
1 +
MN (k)
MY (k)
]
(4)
17 end
18 if |R| < m(1− α) then
19 return FAIL
20 else
21 return R // SUCCESS
22 end
Table I. Key notation for Algorithm 1
mY (k) no. of effective ratings collected in the k-th cycle
mN (k) no. of neutral ratings collected in the k-th cycle
m(k) no. of offers sent out in the k-th cycle
MY (k) no. of effective ratings collected up to the k-th cycle
MN (k) no. of neutral ratings collected up to the k-th cycle
causing ambiguity, we slightly abuse notation by using rj(vi)
to denote a rating score as well as its corresponding semantic
rating (e.g., “Agree”).
Recall from Section III-A that pi is the interim belief of how
likely a representative vi is the ground truth, and that κi is
the bin volume before normalization. We reshape the original
distribution χ by updating pi to the posterior p′i for all i =
1, 2, ..., n, as follows. First, denote
gi =
1
wl
∑
j
rj(vi)1rj(vi)>0, (5)
bi = − 1
wl
∑
j
rj(vi)1rj(vi)<0 (6)
which are the number of normalized positive and negative
ratings, respectively. For each vi, the interim belief pi =
κi/
∑n
j=1 κj can essentially be interpreted as κi out of
∑n
j=1 κj
contributors have “voted” for vi to be the ground truth. Then
during the cross validation phase, another gi out of gi+bi raters
voted for vi. Note that it is not gi out of
∑n
i=1 gi +
∑n
i=1 bi
which is the total number of raters who have given effective
ratings, i.e., |R|. The reason is that the other |R|−gi−bi raters
did not consider vi as a candidate at all since vi was not pushed
to them. Thus, by considering both contributing and validating
crowds, the belief pi could be reshaped as κi+gi∑
j κj+(gi+bi)
. How-
ever, this expression biases toward the larger group between
the contributing crowd and the validating crowd |R|. So we
introduce an equalizing factor
∑n
i=1 κi/|R| to multiply gi
and gi + bi, respectively, and thus the reshaped belief, before
normalization, is given by
pˆi =
κi + ηgi
∑n
i=1 κi
|R|∑n
i=1 κi + η(gi + bi)
∑n
i=1 κi
|R|
=
pi + η
gi
|R|
1 + η gi+bi|R|
. (7)
Here we have introduced a rescaling factor η to allow weighting
a (full-score) rating and an actual sensing contribution differ-
ently. For example, in a traffic monitoring MCS application, if
the GPS sensors function as expected and the satellite signal is
reliable, one could choose η = 0.5 to down-weight the ratings;
whereas if the accuracy of GPS sensors is in doubt (due to, e.g.,
urban canyons and tunnels), one could choose η ≥ 1 to value
the ratings more.
The final posterior belief p′i is then obtained as
p′i = pˆi
/ n∑
i=1
pˆi. (8)
We denote the reshaped profile by χ′ = (V,P ′) where P ′ =
{p′i|i = 1, 2, ..., n} is the set of posterior beliefs (8).
E. Incentive Scheme
To motivate crowdworkers to participate in rating and con-
tributing activities, we provide an incentive scheme that takes
care of both aspects.
Raters: For a rater j who has given an effective rating
rj(vi) 6= 0 for vi, his reputation Rj will be updated to R′j
as
R′j = [Rj + ∆j(vi)]
+ (9)
where [x]+ = max(0, x), and
∆j(vi) =
{
p′i−pi
1−pi
rj(vi)
wl
, if p′i > pi
p′i−pi
pi
rj(vi)
wl
, if p′i < pi.
(10)
The gist of the formulation (10) is twofold:
G1) Qualitatively, if a rating rj is consistent with the belief
adjustment p′i − pi, i.e., a positive rating versus belief
increment or negative versus decrement, then the rater j
will gain reputation. Otherwise, he will lose reputation
which constitutes the penalty mentioned in Section III-C.
G2) Quantitatively, the amplitude of reputation gain or loss is
determined by two factors. One is the amount of belief
adjustment p′i − pi which measures the impact of cross
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validation on the original crowdsensing outcome. The other
factor is the rating score rj which measures the extent
to which the score has contributed to the above belief
adjustment. Both factors are normalized, while the belief
adjustment involves two cases (p′i ≷ pi).
Contributors: A contributor c ∈ C who has contributed
sensing data vi (or that which falls in the i-th bin) will receive
payment as follows. Denote by pic(uc,u−c) the payment stipu-
lated by the original incentive scheme3 of the MCS application,
where uc is the quality of c’s contribution, and u−c are the
qualities of all the other contributors’ contributions. Then after
cross validation, the payment is revised from pic to pi′c as
pi′c = pic
(
uc
p′i(c)
pi(c)
,u′−c
)
,
u′−c =
{
uc˜
p′
i˜
(c˜)
pi˜(c˜)
∣∣∣∣c˜ ∈ C \ {c}} (11)
where pi(c) and p′i(c) are an explicit version of pi and p
′
i,
respectively, that denote c is the contributor. Hence (11) means
that we keep the original incentive scheme pi intact while substi-
tuting all the qualities uc by uc
p′i(c)
pi(c)
. The rationale is that, since
pi(c) and p′i(c) are the likelihoods that vi is the ground truth
under the interim and posterior beliefs, respectively, they can
be treated as the quality and rectified quality of vi, respectively.
Note that, however, the revised payment (11) may lead to the
total payment not equal to the original total payment. Hence
if one needs to satisfy a fixed-budget constraint, the following
payment scheme can be used instead:
pi′′c =
pi′c∑
c˜∈C pi
′
c˜
∑
c˜∈C
pic˜. (12)
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We consider a MCS-based IoT application in the trans-
portation domain. It monitors the average traffic speed of a
major road in a CBD area, by collecting GPS readings from
participating crowdworkers who are drivers and passengers, via
their smartphone- or car-borne GPS sensors. In practice, the
quality of the sensor data are diverse and can be unreliable
due to urban canyons, tunnels, errant driving behaviors, and
faulty sensors. However, besides these workers who are the
“direct” contributors, there are many other regular commuters
who work in the CBD offices and occasional travelers who
frequent the CBD from time to time for meetings. They may
have experienced or witnessed the same traffic conditions as the
MCS contributors do, and thus constitute a good candidate pool
of validating crowd for our cross validation approach to tap on.
A. Simulation Setup
We have implemented our cross validation mechanism using
Java. Our simulation generated a grand pool of |U| = 50, 000
crowdworkers (e.g., those who have registered on a MCS
platform such as Amazon mTurk). Among them, a subset of
|C| = 1000 workers have contributed to the above CBD traffic
monitoring MCS campaign during the morning peak hours of
the day. Then in the cross validation phase, we aim to collect
m = 1000 effective ratings from the remaining 49,000 workers,
with a shortfall tolerance α = 0.1, within T0 = 1 hour.
3There is a rich literature on incentive mechanism design, for example [3],
[5], [7], [20], [21]. For a comprehensive survey, see [4], [22].
To simulate worker behaviors, we use the following user
model. A worker j who is offered a rating task will accept the
offer and give an effective rating with probability aj ∼ U(0, 1),
and decline or ignore the offer or give a neutral rating with
probability 1− aj . Each rater has an estimated truth νj , which
is a Gaussian random variable distributed as per N (ν∗, 5) (unit:
mph) where ν∗ is the real truth. Upon accepting an offer, a
rater j compares the value vi specified in the offer with his
estimated truth νj , and rate 1 if |vi − νj | ≤ THj and -1
otherwise (so wl = 1, l = 1). Here THj is j’s threshold which
is also Gaussian and follows the distribution N (0.1νj , 0.1νj).
Each rater responds to an offer with a delay that follows the
exponential distribution of mean 15 minutes. In the reshaping
step, η = 1 (cf. Eq. 7).
B. Results
The profile of the original crowdsensed data is presented
in Fig. 1, which is obtained using the method described in
Section III-A. The crowdsensed traffic speeds range from 10
to 95 mph and the bin width is 5mph. While the profile seems
to hint that the true traffic speed is likely 45 or 72 mph, the
truth could also be 20mph because of the reason indicated in
the three gray-shaded rectangular regions: the majority of the
sensors yield inaccurate or faulty readings due to low sensor
quality or urban environment, and only a handful provide high-
quality readings. In the following, we refer to the former case
which is ambiguous between 45 and 72 mph as Case A (obscure
truth), and the latter case where the real truth 20mph is buried
among noises as Case B (hidden truth).
Figure 1: Profiling the original crowdsensed traffic speed data. The
three annotations are for Case B only.
Truth reinforcement (Case A): In Case A, the consensus
by majority vote does reveal the truth candidates but lacks of
enough distinction. After applying our cross validation mech-
anism, the reshaped result is shown in Fig. 2, where we see
that all the sampling methods reinforce the real truth (45mph)
by increasing its likelihood in the posterior belief. Proportional
sampling performs the best in this case (a 75% increment)
because it leads to PACAP collecting the most ratings on values
with the highest pi, and hence amplifies the difference the most.
Inverse sampling performs only slightly worse than Reverse
sampling and is not plotted for visual clarity.
Scavenging hidden truth (Case B): In Case B, the real truth
is buried among inaccurate or false sensor readings, or due to
unskilled workers. The reshaped outcome after applying our
cross validation mechanism is shown in Fig. 3, where Reverse
sampling performs the best by boosting the likelihood of the real
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Figure 2: Truth reinforcement for obscure truths (Case A).
truth (20mph) to the maximum among all the three sampling
methods (Inverse sampling performs marginally better). More
specifically, the posterior p′i is a significant 4.9 times of the
interim pi at vi = 20. In the meantime, the likelihood of the two
false truths (45 and 72mph) are notably reduced. Consequently,
the cross validation mechanism will either uncover the real
truth unambiguously, or at least alert the administrator of the
remarkable unreliability of the original crowdsensed data, by
producing the drastic difference between the original and the
reshaped profiles.
Figure 3: Scavenging the hidden truth (Case B).
Overall, we would recommend Reverse sampling because it
handles both cases A and B fairly well and strikes a reasonable
trade-off between proportional sampling and inverse sampling.
Multiple truths and discrete data: The above results also
show that our proposed mechanism is not restricted to single-
truth scenarios but can apply to multi-truth scenarios as well.
In addition, while the sensing data used in the simulation is
continuous traffic speed, it can be seen (from profiling) that our
mechanism works for discrete data as well. These two points
are also mentioned in Section II (under “Remark”).
V. CONCLUSION
To tackle the challenge of data credibility in MCS-based
IoT applications, this paper proposes a new cross validation
approach which further exploits the power of crowds by in-
troducing an extra (yet thin) layer of crowdsourcing on top
of the original crowd-sensing. Following the approach, we
design a specific cross validation mechanism which integrates
four sampling techniques with a progressive PACAP algorithm,
and is well-suited for time-sensitive and quality-critical MCS
applications. The mechanism does not make any assumptions
on strict human rationality, the underlying distribution of sensed
phenomena, or any prior held by workers, and can apply to
both single-truth and multi-truth applications. It is also simple
to implement and extremely lightweight (i.e., requires minimal
effort from workers).
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank Andri R. Lauw who was
involved in the earlier discussion of a related concept.
REFERENCES
[1] B. Guo, S. Yang, J. Lindqvist, X. Xie, and R. K. Ganti, “Special Issue
on Mobile Crowd Sensing for IoT (Guest Editorial),” IEEE Internet Of
Things Journal, vol. 2, no. 5, pp. 355–357, 2015.
[2] J. Liu, H. Shen, and X. Zhang, “A survey of mobile crowdsensing
techniques: A critical component for the Internet of things,” in IEEE
25th International Conference on Computer Communication and Networks
(ICCCN), 2016, pp. 1–6.
[3] T. Luo, S. K. Das, H. P. Tan, and L. Xia, “Incentive mechanism design
for crowdsourcing: An all-pay auction approach,” ACM Transactions on
Intelligent Systems and Technology, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 35:1–26, 2016.
[4] T. Luo, S. S. Kanhere, J. Huang, S. K. Das, and F. Wu, “Sustainable
incentives for mobile crowdsensing: Auctions, lotteries, and trust and
reputation systems,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 55, no. 3, pp.
68–74, March 2017.
[5] H. Jin, L. Su, D. Chen, K. Nahrstedt, and J. Xu, “Quality of information
aware incentive mechanisms for mobile crowd sensing systems,” in ACM
MobiHoc, 2015, pp. 167–176.
[6] T. Luo, S. S. Kanhere, and H.-P. Tan, “SEW-ing a simple endorsement
web to incentivize trustworthy participatory sensing,” in IEEE SECON,
2014, pp. 636–644.
[7] E. Kamar and E. Horvitz, “Incentives and truthful reporting in consensus-
centric crowdsourcing,” MSR-TR-2012-16, Microsoft Research, Tech.
Rep., 2012.
[8] D. Prelec, “A Bayesian truth serum for subjective data,” Science, vol. 306,
no. 5695, pp. 462–466, October 2004.
[9] G. Radanovic and B. Faltings, “A robust Bayesian truth serum for non-
binary signals,” in AAAI, 2013, pp. 833–839.
[10] B. Kantarci, P. M. Glasser, and L. Foschini, “Crowdsensing with social
network-aided collaborative trust scores,” in IEEE Globecom, Dec 2015.
[11] C. Wu, T. Luo, F. Wu, and G. Chen, “EndorTrust: An endorsement-based
reputation system for trustworthy and heterogeneous crowdsourcing,” in
IEEE Globecom, 2015.
[12] K. L. Huang, S. S. Kanhere, and W. Hu, “Are you contributing trustworthy
data?: the case for a reputation system in participatory sensing,” in ACM
MSWiM, 2010, pp. 14–22.
[13] D. Wang, L. Kaplan, H. Le, and T. Abdelzaher, “On truth discovery in so-
cial sensing: A maximum likelihood estimation approach,” in ACM/IEEE
IPSN, 2012, pp. 233–244.
[14] E. Davami and G. Sukthankar, “Improving the performance of mobile
phone crowdsourcing applications,” in AAMAS, 2015, pp. 145–153.
[15] S. Gisdakis, T. Giannetsos, and P. Papadimitratos, “SHIELD: A data veri-
fication framework for participatory sensing systems,” in ACM Conference
on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec), 2015.
[16] P. Michelucci and J. L. Dickinson, “The power of crowds,” Science, vol.
351, no. 6268, pp. 32–33, 2015.
[17] G. James, D. Witten, T. Hastie, and R. Tibshirani, An Introduction to
Statistical Learning. New York: Springer, 2014.
[18] F.-J. Wu, M. R. Brust, Y.-A. Chen, and T. Luo, “The privacy exposure
problem in mobile location-based services,” in IEEE Globecom, 2016.
[19] Y. Zhang, N. Meratnia, and P. Havinga, “Outlier detection techniques for
wireless sensor networks: A survey,” IEEE Communications Surveys &
Tutorials, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 159–170, 2010.
[20] T. Luo, S. S. Kanhere, H.-P. Tan, F. Wu, and H. Wu, “Crowdsourcing
with Tullock contests: A new perspective,” in IEEE INFOCOM, 2015,
pp. 2515–2523.
[21] T. Luo, S. S. Kanhere, S. K. Das, and H.-P. Tan, “Optimal prizes for
all-pay contests in heterogeneous crowdsourcing,” in IEEE International
Conference on Mobile Ad-hoc and Sensor Systems (MASS), 2014, pp.
136–144.
[22] L. G. Jaimes, I. J. Vergara-Laurens, and A. Raij, “A survey of incentive
techniques for mobile crowd sensing,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal,
vol. 2, no. 5, pp. 370–380, Oct 2015.
